Turkish-Bulgarian relations have been full of fluctuations throughout the history, and they reached lowest point in the second part of 1980s. The assimilation campaign against Turkish minority in Bulgaria, which peaked in 1989 when Bulgaria forced hundreds of thousands of Turks to migrate to Turkey, caused a serious crisis in relations with Ankara. The assimilation process led to isolation of Bulgaria in the international arena, thus leading to overthrow of the Zhivkov regime. This was the turning point both in the modern history of Bulgaria and also Turkish-Bulgarian relations. The country entered a new era both in its domestic and foreign policies. With the end of the Cold War, it turned its face toward West and began to take steps to establish democratic political system and free market economic model. Similarly, its foreign policy priorities became integration to Western instituitions, especially NATO and the EU. Ali these changes in domestic and foreign policies have reflected in Turco-Bulgarian ties: The bilateral relations experienced an unexpected boost and the two countries become partners in many areas. Accordingly, this article tries to shed light on the changing state of Turkish-Bulgarian relations after the collapse of the bipolar vvorld order. It argues that the changes in Turco-Bulgarian relations prove the falsity of the ethnic-hatred theory often attributed to the Balkans. The improvement in ties between Ankara and Sofıa shows that when there is an appropriate state of international affairs and rational leaders, Balkan countries can also achieve friendly relations.
Introduction: Turco-Bulgarian Relations Until 1989
The Turks and Bulgarians have common history of approximately 500 years under the Ottoman Em pire After the Bulgarian declaration of independence in 1908, the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria became tense. They fought against each other in the two Balkan Wars, and then became allies in the First World War. During the Turkish War of independence, Bulgaria supported the Turkish forces, and Bulgarians living close to the border formed 30 armed gangs together with Turks living in Adrianople. In 1920 the Turkish soldiers who lost the war in Thrace went över to the Bulgarian side to fıght against Greece.
1 Hovvever, after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, particularly in the late 1920s and much of 1930s, the relations were far from being perfect because of revisionist policies of Bulgaria.
During the Cold War, Turkey and Bulgaria were members of the opposing alliances. While Bulgaria became the most loyal ally of the Soviet communist regime, Turkey joined NATO in 1952. From then on their relations were shadowed by the bipolar structure of the world politics, and bilateral contacts were dependent upon the state of relations bctvveen the two superpowers, as well as Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union. There were short periods of cooperation, though every time, each side looked to the other with apprehension.
1950-51 vvitncssed the fırst important confrontation between the two countries. In 1950 Bulgarian government gave a diplomatic note stating that 250,000 people vvould be sent to Turkey within three months. The flow of refugees lasted for two months and 150,000-155,000 Bulgarian Turks emigrated to Turkey. In early 1980s, Turkish-Bulgarian relations were relatively friendly and there were official visits by the heads of states, Kenan Evren and Todor Zhivkov. However, the rapprochement did not last long as Bulgaria began the assimilation campaign against Turkish minority with a ban on vvearing traditional Turkish dresses and speaking Turkish in public places. Then the Turks were forced, sometimes at gunpoint, to sign forms that stated they had acquired new Bulgarian names voluntarily.
3 There were reports of violence and rape during the campaign. 4 The name-changing campaign lasted between December 1984 and March 1985. Bulgarian authorities argued that the Turks had, in fact, been Slav-Bulgarians who were forcibly converted to islam during the Ottoman Empire. The restrictions implemented on Turks remained in place until late 1989. 5 There were mass demonstrations by Turks against the mounting pressure. But the authorities remained adamant. They used violence to stop the demonstrations. Some demonstrators were killed, some imprisoned, and some sent to notorious Belene Forced Labor Camp. The situation became extremely tense.
In early 1989 Bulgarian government began to deport some activists to Turkey. In Fcbruary 1989, Bulgaria allowed anyone in Bulgaria to emigrate to any country if he or she chooses to do so. Travelling to foreign countries was legalized in May. Then a general exodus of Turkish minority to Turkey took place betvveen June-August 1989. Bulgaria's deportation of Turks meant admission of the fact that there had been a Turkish minority in the country and the attempt to Bulgarize them did not succeed. In ali, more than 300,000 Turks were forced to emigrate to Turkey in this period.
The unexpected deportation of thousands of Turks pushed the bilateral relations to a crisis point. During the crisis, Turkey offered Bulgaria to sign a comprehensive emigration agreement
The reactions to Bulgarian assimilation campaign began as early as in 1985. The 1985 report of the Council of Europe called on Bulgaria to put an immediate end to its repressive policies and to restore their rightful names to ali members of the Turkish minority. 8 The 16 th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in 1987, stated its concern as regards to reports of assimilation campaign and sent a delcgation to examine the situation. 9 The then Turkish Prime Minister Özal asked for help at NATO Summit in May 1989 and criticizcd membcr countries for not showing sensitivity towards Bulgarian pressure. 10 Özal's appeal did not go unheeded. The US postponed trade negotiations with Sofıa. In addition, the Council of Europe repeated its concern for Bulgarian campaign against Turkish minority and asked Bulgaria to stop her policy and to begin negotiations with Turkey with the aim of signing an emigration agreemcnt.
11 Meanvvhile, as a result of Turkey's efforts, the European Community (EC) cancelled the 6 When the communist regime of Bulgaria was toppled in late 1989, the country entercd a ncw period in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. The rights of Turkish minority were restored and mosques re-opened. Although Bulgaria was governed by Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) between 1990 and February 1997, with the exception of eight-months, Bulgarian governments pursued different policies from its communist predecessors. In this ncw era, Bulgaria tricd to be a member of the Western bloc. To reach this aim it tried to repair its relations with Turkey. Bulgarian leadcrs have even apologized publicly on several occasions for what was done to the Turkish minority during the Todor Zhivkov regime.
New leader Mladenov expressed his commitment to democratic principles, albeit within the limits of socialism.
13 He claimed to respect the rights of 'Müslim' minority 14 and relaxed offıcial policy tovvards the Turks. The returning Turks were allowed to go back to their homes. About 50 Turks who were put into prison bccause of cricizing government policies were freed.
The assimilation campaign was formally stopped with a dccrce of 29 December 1989, 15 which signallcd the beginning of a ncw era in Turkish-Bulgarian relations. Accordingly, this study aims to describe the changing state of Turkish-Bulgarian relations in the post-Cold War era. After the crisis years of 1980s, Bulgaria has now become one of the closest neighbors of Turkey. Especially, it has become one of the most cooperative partners for Turkey in the Balkan affairs. Bulgaria in turn seeks Turkish support for its admission to NATO. Looking from this angle, the article argues that the substantial change in Turkish-Bulgarian relations prove the falsity of the ethnic-hatred theory attributed to the Balkans. When there is an appropriate state of international affairs and rational and good-intentioned leaders, Balkan countries can also have friendly relations.
Turkish-Bulgarian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era

Bulgarian Foreign Policy in the New Period
After the overthrow of the communist leader Zhivkov, Bulgaria recognized the existence of Turkish minority, its rights to have Turkish names, to practice islam freely and to have education in its mother language. After taking power, new leader Mladenov immediately apologized for, and repudiated, the assimilation campaign.
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During the Cold War it was impossible for Bulgaria to act independently of the Moscow regime. But now while ali eastern and central European communist governments were falling down one by one, Bulgaria felt alone and and sought to regain the trust of its neighbors, independently from Moscow. Another factor that led Bulgaria to change its policies radically was the damage that was caused by the assimilation process. Besides alienating part of its society vvithin the country, the assimilation policies had resulted in the isolation of the country in the international arena.
Moreover, in the new period, Bulgaria found itself in a security vacuum. Especially after the disbandment of military institutions of the Warsaw Pact on March 31, 1991 and dissolution of the Pact on July 1 the same year, it had to follovv a new path in its foreign policy in compliance with the new state of affairs in world politics. In August 1990, Dobri Jurov, the then Bulgarian Defense Minister, declared for the fırst time that there was a possibility of Bulgaria joining NATO, and on August 30, the Bulgarian Ambassador to Belgium, Atanas Ginev, was accredited to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In June 1991, NATO SecretaryGeneral Manfred Wörner paid an offıcial visit to Bulgaria, which was acknowledged as a great success by both sides. During the visit, he repeated several times that NATO considered Bulgaria an important part of Europe, politically and culturally, and assured that its borders were not to be violated. 17 A few weeks before his visit, more than a third of deputies in the Bulgarian National Assembly had issued a statcment asking the government for making an offıcial application for NATO membership.
18 Bulgaria soon realized that its alliance with the West was dependent on Sofia's readiness to reverse the assimilation policies against Turkish minority and solve its problems with the neighboring countries, especially with Turkey. At that stage, Bulgaria's President Zhelev came out in support of good relations with Turkey. 19 Moreover, as a part of its efforts to forge close ties with the West and to show its readiness for cooperation with Western countries, Bulgaria sent troops to Cambodia as part of a UN peacekeeping mission; offered assistance to the US and its allies during the Gulf War, giving up at the same time a multi-billion dollar contract with Iraq; and even observed embargo against Libya and Yugoslavia at a substantial cost to its economy.
20
Bulgaria's rapprochement with Turkey in the 1990s can only be understood within the framework of Bulgaria's vvesternization attempts. It must also be noted that in the same period Bulgaria tried to improve her relations with Greece as well, and pursued a balanced policy between the two rival countries. 21 The post-Cold War foreign policy of Bulgaria can best be summarized with the words of the former foreign minister of Bulgaria, Stanislav Daskalov:
I think that the purpose of foreign policy is a simple one: to protect the country's national interests aeting in compliance with the internationally accepted standards. There are different means of achieving this purpose. Be it through integration with the European struetures or by expanding the country's relations with its neighbors, being a European country situated in the Balkans, Bulgaria has interests in this aspect, too.
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The contemporary Bulgarian foreign policy is thus based on four pillars: a) the end of the implementation of communist ideology; b) European orientation (implementation of western European approaches to international problems; c) demoeratization of foreign policy based on consensus and transpareney; and d) pragmatism and rationality in the decisionmaking process.
In considering the Balkan policy of Bulgaria, we can add two more pillars: a) multi-lateralism (avoiding alliances with a regional power); and b) equidistance (no participation in regional conflicts).
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Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey's foreign policy has been based upon maintenance of independence and preservation of secularism and modernism.
24 its basic principle has been its western orientation. Turkey", suggested that the two countries should make a joint declaration on human rights to overcome years of annoyance över the treatment of Bulgaria's Turkish minority. Yılmaz declared that "for the fırst time" the two countries used a common language. In the meeting, Bulgarian Foreign Minister also proposed confidence building measures between the two countries in the military sphere. This proposal, which could only be achieved between two allies took Turkey by surprise. After the meeting Turkish diplomats admitted that Bulgarian policy had changed much more than what they had previously expected. 35 Yılmaz underlined the possibility that a new era in bilateral relations could begin "after the new decisions of Bulgaria". 1990 witnessed the fırst steps towards democratization taken by the Bulgarian government. On 15 January, the Bulgarian Communist Party gave up its decade-long monopoly of power. In March, the Bulgarian Parliament adopted unanimously the law that allowed ethnic Turks, and other Müslim peoples to use thcir own names again. In April, the Bulgarian Communist Party renamed itself as the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). It is important to note that in December 1989, a liberal and democracy-oriented party had been formed, named the Union of Democratic Forces, consisting of different dissident groups. Bulgaria held its fırst free elections in June 1990. But it was the BSP that won the elections and was able to form the government alone. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), vvhose members consisted mainly of Turks, got 23 seats in the Parliament. The new government continued to follow the policy of rapprochement with Turkey.
There were four main reasons that caused Bulgaria to seek rapprochement with Turkey after Zhivkov: First, Bulgaria chose to move eloser to Western world after the end of the Cold War. In the emerging new international arena, to assure the country's security, Bulgaria sought admission to NATO. Therefore, she needed to get Turkey's full support to become a member of NATO. Second, without the Soviet support, Bulgaria was vulnerable to the Turkish military power, which had second biggest army in NATO after the US. 36 It appeared more rational for Bulgaria to have good relations with Turkey to feel more secure. Third, the existence of Turkish minority vvithin the borders of Bulgaria does make the contacts betvveen two countries vital. The assimilation campaign of 1980s did not only damage bilateral relations, but also Bulgaria's relations with the Western world and Islaıııic countries. Therefore, to get out of isolation, Bulgaria needed to restore the rights of Turks and also improve its relations with Turkey. Fourth, Bulgarian economy declined throughout 1980s and got a fatal blow by the mass migration to Turkey. To improve economically, it had to get foreign investment, credits and also increase foreign trade. Because of geographical proximity and its successful liberalization program of 1980s, Turkey could have been an appropriate trade partner for Bulgaria.
In 1990s military relations bctween Ankara and Sofıa have also improved. Before the elections of June 1990 in Bulgaria, President Özal stated that Turkey wanted to have friendly relations with Bulgaria irrespective of the outcome of the elections. After the elections, relations improved considerably. In July 1990, a Turkish army inspection team visited Bulgaria. Shortly, thcreafter, Chief of Bulgarian General Staff, Lieutenant General Radnyu Minchev, paid an official visit to Turkey, fırst of its kind since the beginning of communist era in Bulgaria. 37 A few months later, on September 7, Bulgarian Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov paid an official visit to Turkey. He discussed the normalization of relations with Özal and other officials.
The presidential elections of August 1990 should be seen as a turning point with regard to Turkish Bulgarian bilateral relations. The former dissident Zhelu Zhclev, who had earlier condemned Zhivkov's assimilation policies, became President as a result of these elections. The beginning of his term of presidency appeared to reduce doubts in Turkey with regard to Bulgarian attempts for rapprochement.
In December 1990, the two sides concludcd a confidence building agreement. In addition, Turkish officers visited troops and installations in Harmanlı, Bulgaria in May 1991. 38 In the same In return for the support of Turkey for Bulgarian membership of NATO, one of the things that Turkey wanted from Bulgaria was the prohibition of PKK activities in that country. At the beginning of 1994, Bulgarian Anti-Terror Department Director Feodor Vladiminov said that they had met with Turkish officials in July 1993 and concluded a cooperation protocol against international terrorist organizations. 44 Both countries stressed the fact that their improving relations were not directed against any third country, namely Greece. During his visit to SoFıa in July 1995, President Demirel pointed out that the rapprochement betvveen the tvvo countries vvas not against any third country. 45 Bulgarian President Zhelev also said that they insisted on having equally good relations vvith Greece and Turkey. Any attempt to disturb this balance of Bulgaria's Balkan policy to the detriment of one of the tvvo countries for partisan considerations vvould be disastrous for Bulgaria's foreign policy. 46 Conflicts in the Balkans opened ne w opportunities for cooperation betvveen Turkey and Bulgaria. When BosniaHerzegovina declared its independence in April 1992, Serbian aggression turned tovvards Muslims and Croats of BosniaHerzegovina after attacks vvaged against Croatia and Slovenia, 47 vvhich continued until US-brokered Dayton Peace Accord in 1995. Even though Yugoslav trade had accounted for 10-12% of Bulgaria's entire foreign trade, Sofıa implemented the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia from July 1992 onvvard. 48 The embargo cost Bulgaria 40 million US dollars per month, hurting its connection to the vvest, therefore its tourism and foreign investment. 49 At the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia, both Bulgaria and Turkey supported the territorial integrity of the country, Turkey, too, extended diplomatic recognition to Macedonia, but she did it without any reservation. Both countries were against Greek policy of not recognizing Macedonia diplomatically.
Bulgarian Policy Towards Turkish Minority and its Effect Upon Turkish-Bulgarian Relations
More than 920 mosques have re-opened in Bulgaria since 1990. Religious literatüre, including Koran, both in Bulgarian and Turkish, is being published freely. Study of Turkish language in schools, although as extracurriculum, has been reintroduced. Publication of Turkish newspapers, magazines, national radio broadcasts, daily TV programmes in Turkish have also been allowed. 52 Bulgaria has adopted a new constitution in 1991, which does not recognize special rights for minorities, but guarantees human rights of ali individuals living in the country. Another factor that has contributed to the promotion of minority rights and peaceful integration of Turkish minority to the Bulgarian political system has been the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), vvhich was officially registered as a political party in January 1990. It existed as an underground organization since 1985.
54 Within a period of little more than one year after its legal establishment, it became the fourth largest political organization in Bulgaria. 55 Then, it even moved up to third position. According to the new Bulgarian constitution and election law after the collapse of the communism, no political party can be formed along ethnic and religious lines. Therefore, MRF states that it docs not only represent Turks, but ali people living in Bulgaria, although most of its members are of Turkish origin.
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Having gained around 7.5 % of the votes in the elections in 1991, it has since played key role in the Parliament. The party proved its effectiveness both in the formation and dissolution of governments. In 1992, whcn it withdrew its support, the government fell. The next technocrats government of Prof. Lyuben Bcrov could again be formed with the support of the MRF. 57 The then leader of the main opposition party, UDF, Ivan Kostov, stated before the upcoming early general elections of April 1997 that MRF has considerable importance in the Parliament, specially with regard to issues like constitutional change.
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Peaceful accommodation of Turkish minority within the political system was avvarded by the international community. For example, it has contributed to a considerable extent to Bulgaria When the former Turkish Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Işın Çelebi, visited Bulgaria together vvith some Turkish businessmen in October 1990, he declared Turkey's readiness for economic cooperation vvith Bulgaria. Soon after the visit Ankara offered Bulgaria a loan of 100 million dollars; half of that was to be used to purchase basic consumer goods, other half for investments. Turkey also agreed to give Bulgaria 50,000 tons of crude oil to help reduce its fuel and energy crisis. 69 Moreover, Turkey helped Bulgaria through Türk-Eximbank credits. In 1991 Türk-Eximbank and Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank signed an agreement; according to which, Turkey provided 50 million dollar trade credit to Bulgaria. Another 50 million dollars were given in November 1992. Bulgarian-Turkish Council of the Business People was established by Bulgarian and Turkish businessmen in 1991. 70 As a result of improving bilateral economic relations, Bulgarian-Turkish trade has increased from 42 million dollars in 1990 to 511 million dollars in 1996. 71 After the collapse of the communist regime, membership to NATO became a priority of Bulgarian foreign policy. Former Bulgarian President Zhelev has been one of the most consistent NATO supporters among Balkan leaders. Accordingly, Bulgaria signed Partnership for Peace Programme vvith NATO in 1994. Zhelev stated that Bulgaria regarded this initiative merely as an intermediate goal on the way to full membership to NATO and Western European Union (WEU). 72 Bulgarian government officially stated the country's desire to join NATO in 1997. 73 Hovvever, NATO has accepted membership of only three countries in the fırst wave, namely Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic. Bulgaria was left for the second wave. Therefore, Bulgaria's fırst foreign policy priority is stili to gain membership in NATO and Turkey has already expressed support for Bulgaria's bid for NATO membership.
Bulgaria also signed association agreement with the EC in March 1993, and begun negotiations for membership in early 2000. In the short run it is not possible for Bulgaria to become a full member, mostly because it could not fulfill Copenhagen criteria, especially in the fıeld of economy. 74 Bulgaria has been aware of the fact that EU membership would not come soon. The former president Zhelev admitted that it would take much longer than NATO membership, because of the fact that Bulgarian economy was not ready to compete with Europe. 75 
The Political and Economic Crisis in Bulgaria
Bulgaria experienced a severe economic crisis during late 1996 and early 1997. The annual inflation rate reached 311% in 1996. There was also shortage of grain. The crisis resulted from 72 the delay of structural reforms, large foreign debt burden, and failure to draw foreign investment.
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As a result of the economic crisis, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov resigned both from leadership of Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and premiership. The economic situation in the country vvorsened in early 1997, with monthly inflation rate reaching to 43.8% in January and 242.7% in February. Bulgarian population began daily demonstrations ali över the country in January, calling for resignation of BSP government and also for early elections. In the end, the government could not resist any longer and resigned in February 1997. A caretaker government, formed with the leadership of Sofia mayor Stefa Sofijanski, signed a standby agreement with the IMF that brought the introduction of a currency board and radical economic measures, thus easing the economic crisis in the country. 77 In November 1996 there were presidential elections in Bulgaria in which Western-oriented Petar Stoyanov became the president beginning from January 1997. In addition, general elections took place in April 1997 that brought pro-Western UDF to power again with a great margin. This has been the beginning of a new period in Turkish-Bulgarian relations.
Kostov Government in Bulgaria and Turkish-Bulgarian Relations
Although the Turco-Bulgarian rapprochement began and continued mostly during the goverments of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, United Democratic Forces' ascendance to power in 1997, together with the victory of Petar Stoyanov from the same party in 78 Similarly, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Nadezhda Mihailova, has declared that Bulgaria currently enjoys excellent ties with Turkey, and that her country has experienced irreversible break with the past.
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Since the formation of technocrats' government in 1997, Bulgaria has been doing everything to promote its relationship with the Western world. It tries to solve ali its long-standing problems with its neighbours, like border problem with Turkey and language problem with Macedonia. Acknovvledging the fact that respect for minorities is a necessary condition for uniting with European structures, it has ratifıed the Framevvork Agreement of the Council of Europe for the Protection of National Minorities in 1999.
The resolution of language dispute with Macedonia was a great asset in this regard. Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the independence of Macedonia; but it refused to accept the existence of Macedonian nation and language for a long time. In February 1999, hovvever, Bulgaria and Macedonia solved this problem by signing an agreement in "Bulgarian in accordance with the Constitution of Bulgaria, and Macedonian in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia." The document has signalled a compromise by Bulgaria, that is a de facto recognition of Macedonian language. Although Bulgaria in general has good relationship vvith the EU, Kostov's criticism of it in early 1999 has brought some problems to the surface. In an interview with Reuters, Kostov criticized EU, saying that it has "done nothing for Bulgaria or has done negligibly little". 81 He further pointed out that the EU was exercising a "meaningless diktat" by demanding closure of some reactors of Kozluduy nuclear plant as precondition to Bulgarian membership in the EU. He emphasized that a shutdown would destroy what little competitiveness Bulgaria stili has after suffering severe fınancial crisis of early 1997. In response, the EU offıcials insist that they had got promises from Bulgaria for early closure of some oldest reactors at Kozluduy nuclear plant. However, Bulgaria does not want to close them for the time being, as it stili obtains considerable amount of electricity from the plant. 83 EU decision has caused celebrations in Bulgaria. As President Stoyanov said, "For Bulgarian citizens the Berlin Wall fell today", 84 which proved that the EU would seriously consider Bulgaria's candidacy.
Stoyanov's visit to Turkey in July 1997 was the evidence of closer relationship between the two countries. During the visit, Bulgarian President apologized for the assimilation campaign of 1980s. 85 The two countries signed a military cooperation agreement, covering defense and security policies, as well as technological and scientific training. 86 Stoyanov also asked Turkey to use its influence to push for Bulgaria's removal from the Organization for Islamic Countries' list of countries that did not In December 1997 Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz paid an official visit to Bulgaria . It was the fırst such visit by a Turkish prime minister in 18 years. 90 During the visit, a dispute lasting for 50 years about the border in the delta of the Rezovska River, which flovvs into the Black Sea, was resolved. According to the agreement, the borderline now passes right in the middle of the river mouth. It was also reported that the two countries agreed to form a vvorking group that will deal with problems of separated families and work to eliminate visa problems. world."
92 According to Yılmaz, there were no existing problems between Turkey and Bulgaria: "Especially the point where our bilateral relations reached in the last eight months is an example to other neighboring countries." 93 Kostov's visit to Turkey in November 1998 was good news for Bulgarian Turks who had emigrated to Turkey. The two parties signed an agreement, according to which the emigrants could now receive their pensions in Turkey. 94 After 1989, in the West, Bulgaria has been considered as a good example of how a Balkan country could solve its minority problem in a peaceful manner. Beginning from late 1989, Bulgaria has improved the situation of its Turkish minority so much so that in late 2000, Bulgarian state television began broadcasting news in Turkish after the aftemoon daily news in Bulgarian. 95 Although Bulgaria has regranted many rights to its Turkish minority and even provided it with new rights, there stili exist some problems. According to the Bulgaria Country Report on Human Rights Practices, released by the US Department of State on February 26, 1999, Bulgaria's plans for the establishment of national TV station to broadcast in Turkish has not yet been implemented. There is only limited radio broadcasting in Turkish on national radio's local affıliates in regions where there is a sizable Turkish speaking population. 96 The same criticism has been expressed by the leader of the MRF, Ahmed Doğan. According to him, the radio broadcasts in Turkish today are only one hour per day, while in Zhivkov's time it was four hours. He also argues that there are American, French and Greek high schools, but no Turkish school. Moreover, instead of present optional extracurriculum courses, he calls for compulsory Turkish classes for the Turkish minority. Doğan also claims that the underdevelopment of Turkish populated regions have been the result of deliberate government policies of not investing in these regions. Hc says: "during Zhivkov's time the oppression was overt. Now, it is covert." Both Turkey and Bulgaria have common concerns in determining policy regarding the turmoil in Kosovo. Both countries have been uncomfortable with the fact that security in the Balkans was threatened with the Serbian aggression. In addition, Bulgaria was aware of the fact that Kosovo problem has deferred potential investors in Bulgaria that urgently needs foreign investment for economic recovery. The embargo against Yugoslavia was also hurting economic situation in the country. 98 Apart from that, the case of minority problem leading to civil war in Yugoslavia has pleased neither Turkey nor Bulgaria, both of which have minorities at home. Therefore, both countries stated immediately their preference for keeping territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Moreover, Kosovo crisis was an opportunity for both countries to show their solidarity with the Western world. Turkey, as member of NATO, has allowed tvvo of its military bases to be 97 Although Turkey appreciates Bulgaria's support for its fıght against terrorism, it insists on the prohibition of pro-PKK activities on Bulgarian territory and also tries to obtain Bulgaria's declaration of PKK as a terrorist organization. In response, Bulgaria states that it does not consider the PKK as a terrorist organization, because it does not have any criminal activities in Bulgaria. 120 Sofia also claims that since other Kurdish organizations are not involved in terror or criminal activities, it can not close them down.
Turkey keeps warning Bulgaria against support or easing of facilities for PKK-related activists in the country, and calls for a ban on PKK activities in the country. 121 In similar fashion, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms criticizes Bulgarian policy towards Kurdish groups, as well. It argues that the government of Bulgaria is indiffercnt to the PKK and calls on the government to prevent the terror organization from acting in the country.
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Some of the Kurdish groups in Bulgarian territory are; Kurdish Cultural Club, Patriotic Union of Kurdish Students, Association of Kurdish Fellow Countrymen, and Bulgarian Cultural and Information Center for Kurdistan. Bulgaria argues that these are just cultural organizations and neither any PKK structure nor activity have been found in the country so far. Different attitudes displayed by the two countries may stili create problems in bilateral relations in the future.
In sum, Bulgaria respects Turkish sensitivity on the Kurdish issue and tries not to irritate Turkey. But its position is far from satisfying for Turkey, mainly because it insists on not declaring the PKK a terror organization. And whenever the issue becomes internationalized, it prefers to follovv the European policy closely. 
Developments in Economic Relations
In July 1998, the two countries signed a free trade agreement that has entered into force as of January 1, 1999. 123 The agreement foresees decreasing customs duties for industrial goods gradually and reducing it to zero in 2002. It also foresees the establishment of free trade zones between the two countries.
Turkey and Bulgaria have increased economic cooperation as well in recent years. They increased energy cooperation through signing of a fıve-year agreement in March 1997. That would boost cooperation in the energy field. Bulgaria exports 300-400 megawath of electricity monthly to Turkey, getting mountly income of 10 million dollars. 124 In 1998 another agreement was signed, according to which Turkey would purchase electricity from Bulgaria for 10 years; in retum, Turkey's Ceylan Holding would build 114-km-long highway between Orizovo and Kaptan Andrevo and will construct three dams within the framework of Upper Arda Project. 125 But, in March 2001 Bulgaria has cancelled the agreement stating that "the concession was cancelled as Ceylan Holding's sister firm, a shareholder in the Gorna Arda joint venture, has not proved its financial and technical abilities to do the project, due to be built by the concessionaire". When the geographical proximity and number of Turkish origin people in Bulgaria have been taken into account, the amount of Turkish trade and investment seems not enough. Economic situation in southeastern Bulgaria, vvhere Turks constitute majority of the population, is much worse than other parts. 129 Therefore, Turkey should consider to encourage Turkish businessmen to invest there. This would discourage emigration of Turks of Bulgaria to Turkey because of economic diffıculties and contribute to the development of these regions. It now seems that Turkish businessmen favor Romania among Balkan countries because of its bigger population, but Bulgaria must not be ignored.
Conclusion
Because of their membership to opposing power blocs, bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria generally remained tense during the Cold War. Although they experienced some normalization periods, these were always short-lived. The assimilation campaign of 1980s and the deportation of more than 300,000 Turks by the Bulgarian government in 1989 worsened the Turkish-Bulgarian relations.
However, changes in both international and domestic dynamics of late 1980s have allowed quick rapprochement between the two countries. As regards to world system, the fail of Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War restrictions on the one hand; and concerning domestic system, overthrow of Zhivkov in Bulgaria on the other, have changed the orientation of Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy from socialist to pro-European one, like most of other east and central European countries. Thus, the post-Cold War domestic and foreign policy of Bulgaria, including its policy towards Turkey, must be analyzed within its Europeanization efforts.
As soon as Todor Zhivkov was ousted from power by the reformist wing of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the new government under Mladenov sought ways to improve relations vvith Turkey. The fırst thing it did vvas to restore rights to Turkish minority and put an end to the assimilation policy. The nevv government of Bulgaria re-allowed Turks to use their Turkish names, to have access to education in their mother language and to practice their religion free from any restriction, notvvithstanding opposition from Bulgarian public at the beginning. It has also allovved participation of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, composed mostly of Turkish members, into the political system.
At the beginning of the nevv era in Bulgarian politics, Turkey remained cautious. It could not fully trust Bulgaria vvhether vvhat the Bulgarian communist regime called the "regeneration process" against Turkish minority vvould not be repeated. But, as time vvent by, Turkey could believe in the continuation of a nevv period in Bulgaria. Thanks to establishment of mutual trust, they began to cooperate in different fıelds, including security, in a year time follovving the crisis of 1989. It must be noted that the cooperation betvveen the tvvo countries vvas achieved during the tenure of Bulgarian Socialist Party, that is, the successor to the Bulgarian Communist Party.
For Bulgaria, it has been vital to improve its relations vvith Turkey, because; fırst, it vvants to be a member of European institutions, like NATO and EU, and Turkey's support is important especially concerning its relations vvith NATO; second, about 10% of its population is of Turkish origin, therefore, it can not ignore relations vvith Turkey; third, it should solve ali its problems vvith neighboring countries to become part of European struetures; fourth, Turkey has second biggest army vvithin NATO, so, to assure the security of its southern border, it must have friendly relations with its neighbor; fıfth, Turkey, with a population more than 65 million people and a dynamic economy is an important market for Bulgarian goods and enthusiastic businessmen of Turkey can also be a good source of foreign investment that Bulgaria is in dire need of.
On the other hand, Bulgaria is an important ally for Turkey, first and foremost, because Ankara has uncomfortable relationship with most of its neighbors. 130 In such a neighborhood, it makes sense for Turkey to improve its relations with Bulgaria. Moreover, Bulgaria is considered as an island of stability in the Balkans, vvhich has witnessed considerable number of bloody conflicts in the new era. Therefore, it provides a reliable ally for Turkey for cooperation in solving regional conflicts, like the Bosnian War and the Kosovo crisis. Turkey must also take the situation of Turkish minority living in Bulgaria into consideration and that is why it must closely follow Bulgaria's policy towards them. From the economic point of view, Bulgaria, especially because of its geographical proximity, is a significant market for Turkish products. In addition, Bulgarian privatization programme provides an important opportunity for Turkish businessmen.
The victory of western-oriented United Democratic Forces both in the Bulgarian presidential and general elections, in November 1996 and April 1997 respectively has paved the way for even closer relationship with Turkey. Turkish side has found a more appropriate counterpart as a result of these elections. Turkish and Bulgarian high-level offıcials have met often, concluding agreements from abolition of customs, facilitation of the pension payments of Turkish emigrants in Turkey, to cooperation against organized erime and drug smuggling, as well as cooperation in military affairs. 131 Considering the wide area of cooperation, changes of government in either country should not be expected to reverse the pattern of relationship between them. The fact that Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement began during the government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party is an evidence of this.
